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On the eve of Griswold v. Connecticut's fiftieth anniversary,
employers are bringing challenges under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) to a federal law requiring them to include
contraception in the health insurance benefits that they offer their
employees. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, five Justices concluded
that the government has compelling interests in ensuring employees
access to contraception, but did not discuss these interests in any detail.
In what follows, we clarify these interests by connecting discussion in
the Hobby Lobby opinions and the federal government's briefs to
related cases on compelling interests and individual rights in the areas
of race and sex equality.
The government's compelling interests, we argue, are best
understood from within two horizons. First, they encompass core
concerns of the community in promoting public health and facilitating
women's integration in the workplace. Second, they encompass crucial
concerns of the employees who are the intended beneficiaries of the
Affordable Care Act's contraceptive coverage requirement---concerns
that sound in bodily integrity, personal autonomy, and equal
citizenship. Further, as we show, a full accounting of the government's
compelling interests attends both to their material and expressive
dimensions.
This more comprehensive account of the government's-compelling
interests in providing employees access to contraception matters both
in political debate and in RFRA litigation as courts determine whether
the government has pursued its interests by the least restrictive means.
The more comprehensive account offered here is less susceptible to
compromise and tradeoffs than is an account focused only on material
interests in public health and contraceptive cost.
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Compelling Interests and Contraception
NEIL S. SIEGEL* & REVA B. SIEGEL**
Under our cases, women (and men) have a constitutional
right to obtain contraceptives, see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-486 (1965) ....
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores (2014)1
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal law often vindicates constitutional values in ways that exceed
judicially enforceable constitutional requirements. Examples include laws
prohibiting race or sex discrimination in the private sector, or regulations
requiring employees' health insurance benefits to cover contraception.2
Such statutory protections address vital concerns of the community and
crucial concerns of individuals, and they help to make meaningful the
exercise of constitutional rights.
The permissive accommodation of religion offers another example. In
the ordinary case, laws of general applicability do not violate the Free
Exercise Clause even when they substantially burden an individual's
religious exercise.3 But in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
Congress provided additional protection to individuals whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by laws of general applicability-unless
granting the exemption would compromise compelling interests of the
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'134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779-80 (2014).
2 Consider the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012), and the regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that are discussed in Part I.
' See, e.g., Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
("Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability .
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
government in enforcing these laws.4
Whether granting an exemption would compromise compelling
government interests was at issue in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores.' In
this case, the religious owners of a for-profit corporation brought a RFRA
challenge to federal regulations requiring them to include contraceptive
coverage as part of the insurance that they provide to their female
employees.6 Although the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately held that
application of the regulations to the complainants violated RFRA, five
Justices concluded that the government has compelling interests in
ensuring women (and men) access to affordable contraception.7 None of
the Justices, however, fully explicated these interests.
This Essay aims to enhance understanding of the government's
compelling interests in providing employees access to contraception. These
compelling interests, we argue, are best understood from within two
horizons. First, they encompass core concerns of the community in
promoting public health and facilitating women's integration in the
workplace. Second, they encompass crucial concerns of the employees
who are the intended beneficiaries of federal law's contraceptive coverage
requirement-concerns that sound in bodily integrity, personal autonomy,
and equal citizenship. As we show, a full accounting of these compelling
interests attends both to their material and expressive dimensions.
This more comprehensive understanding of the government's interests
matters. Courts facing claims for religious exemption under RFRA must
decide whether the government can exempt the faith claimant without
compromising its compelling interests in enforcing other laws. How judges
answer this question depends on how they understand the government's
interests in enforcing these laws.
The timing of current RFRA challenges to contraceptive coverage
requirements under federal law is noteworthy. These challenges are
occurring on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Supreme Court's
decision recognizing the right to use contraception in Griswold v.
Connecticut.8 In Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito invoked the constitutional
right vindicated in Griswold in the course of discussing the government's
assertion of compelling interests in providing employees insurance
' Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 (a), (b) (2012)). See infra Part II for further discussion of RFRA's
provisions.
5 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
6 Id. at 2765.
Id. at 2758, 2779-80, 2785-86.
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). Griswold held that married couples have a fimdamental
constitutional right to use contraception, and the Court extended this right to unmarried people seven
years later. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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coverage of contraception,9 but he did not discuss these interests in any
detail. In what follows, we examine the Court's discussion of compelling
interests in the areas of race and sex equality. Looking back to the Court's
prior case law brings into view additional dimensions of the government's
compelling interests that were identified by the Solicitor General and
endorsed by a majority of the Court.
Part H documents that five Justices found compelling interests in
Hobby Lobby, but also notices omissions in the compelling interest
discussions of all the Justices in this case. To identify additional
compelling interests at stake, Part III surveys the Court's jurisprudence of
compelling interests, which identifies two horizons within which
compelling interests may be ascertained. Part [V examines, from each of
these perspectives, the compelling interests that support the government's
efforts to ensure women and men access to effective and affordable
contraception. A conclusion suggests why this more comprehensive
account of the government's interests in providing employees access to
contraception matters in politics as well as law.
II. THE OPINIONS IN HOBBYLOBBY
RFRA provides that the government "shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion" unless it "demonstrates that application of
the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest."' In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme
Court considered the legality of regulations adopted by the three
departments that are responsible for implementing the relevant portion of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).t These regulations
require non-grandfathered group health insurance plans offered by
employers to cover contraception. 2 Dividing five to four, the Court held
that the regulations violate RFRA as applied to closely held, for-profit
corporations whose owners raise religious objections to paying for their
employees' insurance covering contraception. 3 Specifically, the Court
concluded that the regulations were not the least restrictive means of
advancing the government's interests. 14
9 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779-80 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86).
"0 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (2012)).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (Supp. V 2011); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2013)
(Department of Health and Human Services); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv) (2013) (Department
of Labor); 26 C.F.R. 54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv) (2013) (Department of the Treasury).
12 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2758-59.
131d. at 2785, 2787 (2014).
14Id. at 2759-60.
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Although the Court held that the regulations violated RFRA, five
Justices concluded that the government has compelling interests in
ensuring women access to affordable contraception. 5 Justice Kennedy,
who joined the majority opinion in full, also wrote separately in part to
affirm the existence of a compelling interest. "It is important to confirm,"
he emphasized, "that a premise of the Court's opinion is its assumption
that the [Health and Human Services] regulation here at issue furthers a
legitimate and compelling interest in the health of female employees."' 6 He
subsequently declared that "the law deems compelling" the interests of
female employees in securing access to affordable contraception.' 7 In a
dissenting opinion that Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined,
Justice Ginsburg invoked Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey"8 for the proposition that "' [t]he ability of women to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.""' 9 She later
referenced "compelling interests in public health and women's well
being."2
Justice Alito, who wrote the majority opinion invalidating the
regulations on narrow tailoring grounds, assumed for purposes of analysis
that Congress's interest in providing women insurance coverage of
contraception was compelling under RFRA.2 In requiring employer-
provided insurance to cover contraception, Justice Alito reported, the
government sought to promote "public health" and "gender equality."22 He
then related the government's interests in enacting the statute to the
concerns of the citizens on whom the statute conferred benefits, citing
Griswold v. Connecticut23 and observing that "[u]nder our cases, women
(and men) have a constitutional right to obtain contraceptives. 24 Justice
Alito again discussed the concerns of individual citizens in a statute's
enforcement when he asserted "that in applying RFRA 'courts must take
adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose
Id. at 2785-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring), id. at 2787, 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
17 Id. at 2787. Specifically, he made clear that people who exercise their religion may not "unduly
restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their own interests, interests the law deems
compelling." Id. Kennedy thus indicated that he thought compelling interests had been established and
should not merely be assumed. Presumably, the members of the majority coalition in Hobby Lobby
disagreed about whether there were compelling interests.
" 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
'9 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at
856).
2Id. at 2799 (majority opinion).
21 Id. at 2779.
22 id.
23 Id. at 2779-80 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
24 id.
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on nonbeneficiaries."' 25 He then observed that this "consideration will
often inform the analysis of the Government's compelling interest."
26
The opinions in Hobby Lobby, however, did not fully explicate the
government's compelling interests in ensuring access to affordable
contraception. The government's account, too, was incomplete. It
appropriately emphasized a compelling interest in "public health, 27 but it
did not develop what was at stake for women as a matter of individual
autonomy and self-determination. 2  Likewise, the government's merits
brief invoked "gender equality '29 and asserted the "importance, both to the
individual and to society, of removing the barriers to economic
advancement and political and social integration that have historically
plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including women,"3 but the brief
focused on cost differences that women and men face in purchasing
contraception.
Questions about the government's compelling interests in ensuring
access to affordable contraception will multiply in the years ahead, not
only under federal law but also under state law.31 In what follows, we read
Hobby Lobby alongside Supreme Court decisions that have endorsed the
government's compelling interests in ending race and sex discrimination.
Contextualizing Hobby Lobby in this way brings into view aspects of the
government's interests in promoting access to contraception that the
Justices discussed in the case, as well as others that they did not.
25 Id. at 2781 n.37 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005)).
26 Id. For development of this point, see Doug NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars:
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2580-85 (2015)
(discussing the compelling interest and least restrictive means inquiries in Hobby Lobby).
27 Brief for the Petitioners at 15-16, 46-49, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (No. 13-354).
28 In its Reply Brief, the Solicitor General observed in passing that the female employees of the
Hobby Lobby Corporation are "real people, whose statutory rights, health, and pocket-book interests-
not to mention individual dignity and autonomy-are directly at issue." Reply Brief for the Petitioners at
16, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354).
29 Brief for the Petitioners at 15, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(No. 13-354).30 Id. at 85 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984)).
31 See BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION
§ 7:6 (2014 ed.) ("As a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's declaration in Boerne that RFRA was
unconstitutional, a number of states have enacted religious freedom statutes modeled extensively on
that federal statute.") (footnote omitted); id. (identifying those states as Arizona, Connecticut, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia); id. (noting that
"Alabama amended its state constitution to require strict judicial scrutiny of religious freedom claims").
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III. THE Two HORIZONS
As we show, a complete account of the compelling interests that
support a law will take into consideration both the concerns of the
community and the concerns of the intended beneficiaries of the law.
These dual concerns are evident in decisions that deem compelling the
government's interests in eradicating race discrimination and sex
discrimination.
In Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito asserted without elaboration that "[t]he
Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to
participate in the workforce without regard to race."32 To understand this
interest, we might look back to the Court's 1983 decision in Bob Jones
University v. United States,33 which rejected free exercise and other
challenges to the IRS's denial of tax-exempt status to a private religious
school that offered faith-based reasons for discriminating on the basis of
race.34 In explaining why "[t]he governmental interest at stake here is
compelling," the Court emphasized the interest that American society as a
whole has in eradicating race discrimination, 35 and it reasoned about this
interest in remedial terms. "[T]he Government has a fundamental,
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education," the
Court declared, "discrimination that prevailed, with official approval, for
the first 165 years of this Nation's constitutional history." 36
But the nation's compelling interest in eradicating race discrimination
is not only backward looking. In prohibiting race discrimination, the public
also expresses the identity and values of the polity as a whole, defending
and furthering its form of life as a community. Shared understandings of
this kind are essential if a society is to realize its claims to provide equal
32 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014). Justice Alito added that
"prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal." Id.
" 461 U.S. 574, 577, 612 (1983).
14 Id. at 577, 612 (holding that Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools, "non-
profit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially discriminatory admissions standards on the
basis of religious doctrine," did not qualify as tax-exempt organizations under § 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954). The Court noted that the sponsors of Bob Jones University "genuinely
believe that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage." Id. at 580. The Court further noted that
"[s]ince its incorporation in 1963, Goldsboro Christian Schools has maintained a racially
discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible." Id. at 583 (footnote
omitted). According to Goldsboro's interpretation, "race is determined by descendance from one of
Noah's three sons-Ham, Shem, and Japheth. . . . [clultural or biological mixing of the races is
regarded as a violation of God's command." Id. at 583 n.6. For an explication of the biblical argument
for racial segregation based upon "Noah's Curse," see William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah's Curse: How
Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L.
REv. 657, 665-67 (2011) (discussing how religious leaders used "Noah's Curse" to justify slavery and
racial segregation).
3 Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 (footnote omitted).
36Id. (footnote omitted).
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citizenship and to practice democracy. In Grutter v. Bollinger,37 the Court
emphasized the government's compelling interest in showing its citizens-
not just when the government speaks, but when citizens themselves look
around 38-that America is one society, not two. "In order to cultivate a set
of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry," the Court wrote, "it
is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.- 39
These backward and forward-looking interests in eradicating race
discrimination are both material and expressive, leading the government to
combat the distributive legacies of segregation and its social meanings.40
Yet as important as these material and expressive concerns of the
community are, they do not exhaust the government's compelling interests
in combatting race discrimination.
Other decisions have emphasized that the government's compelling
interests in ending race discrimination can be understood within a second
horizon-from the perspective of the individuals protected by a legislative
prohibition on race discrimination. For example, in upholding Congress's
power to enact Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States,41 the Court stressed that the "fundamental
object" of the federal ban on race discrimination in public accommodations
"was to vindicate 'the deprivation of personal dignity that surely
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments."'42 This
protection for individual dignity has both liberty and equality dimensions.
Individuals have liberty concerns in self-definition-that is, in the
capacity to develop a life plan, including work and family projects, free of
the constraints that public and private race discrimination may impose.
37 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3 Compare id. at 332 ("Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the
civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized."), with
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) ("In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.").
39 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
" In a similar vein, the community has a concern in enforcing the criminal law for reasons that
are not exhausted by the prevention of violence. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Reciprocity and the
Criminal Responsibility of Corporations, 41 STETSON L. REV. 73, 91 (2011) (defending
"[clommunicative, [c]haracter-[b]ased retributivism" on the ground that "[s]ociety must thus punish
offenders to counter their demeaning messages, replacing the messages with clear statements that
offenders are no better than those upon whom they prey" (footnote omitted)). In both cases, the nature
of the polity as a polity is also implicated. In acting to eradicate racism and to enforce the criminal law,
the community is not only affecting the distribution of material opportunities, but also is creating social
meanings.
41 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
42 Id. at 250 (quoting the report of the Senate Commerce Committee, S. REP. No. 88-872 (1964));
see also NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 26, at 2574-75 ("But of course a refusal to serve also has
dignitary effects. This objection became clear during the civil rights movement, when denials of service
at lunch counters were understood as meaning-making transactions.").
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Freedom from race discrimination greatly affects the ability of individuals
to provide materially for themselves and for their families, and to make
positive meaning out of their own lives. Individuals also have equality
concerns in living free of race discrimination that have both material and
expressive dimensions. Part of what is at stake for them is their ability to
participate in the educational, economic, and political life of the
community. Also at stake for them is their standing in the community.
Whether they possess or lack equal citizenship stature determines whether
they live as outsiders looking in, or as insiders looking around.
The liberty and equality concerns of individuals in not being subject to
race discrimination are not the same as the community's concerns in
ending race discrimination. Yet both underwrite the Court's justifiable
confidence in Hobby Lobby that "[t]he Government has a compelling
interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce
without regard to race."'43
The Court expressly reasoned from within these two horizons when it
upheld a law prohibiting sex discrimination by distinguishing between the
"social and personal harms" that sex discrimination causes.' In Roberts v.
United States Jaycees,45 the Court held that the government possesses a
''compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female
citizens," '46 explaining that sex discrimination "both deprives persons of
their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide
participation in political, economic, and cultural life.' 47
In Jaycees, a private organization argued that a state law requiring it to
admit women as full voting members violated the constitutional freedom of
association of its members.48 The Court acknowledged that the case
"plainly implicated" the First Amendment right of Jaycees members "to
associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." '49 The Court
nonetheless rejected their constitutional challenge, emphasizing "the
importance, both to the individual and to society, of removing the barriers
to economic advancement and political and social integration that have
historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including women."5 In
4 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984).
4' 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
46 Id. at 625.
41 Id. (citing Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744-45 (1984); Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-26 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-87 (1973)
(plurality opinion)).
48Seeid. at 612.
41 Id. at 622-23.
'1 Id. at 626 (emphasis added) (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam),
and Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684-86).
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addition to such material concerns, the Court invoked the "stigmatic
injury" emphasized by the Court in Heart of Atlanta,5' which "is surely felt
as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as
by those treated differently because of their race."52
The compelling interest analysis in Hobby Lobby invoked these same
two horizons of concern. The majority observed that the compelling
interests potentially served by enforcing the ACA's contraceptive coverage
requirement include not only the community's concerns, but also the
concerns of the citizens who benefit from the law. As noted in Part II,
Justice Alito mentioned "public health," 3 a community concern. He also
cited Griswold for the proposition that "[u]nder our cases, women (and
men) have a constitutional right to obtain contraceptives" 5a-an individual
concern. He discussed the individual citizen's concern about the
enforcement of a statute designed to protect her as relevant to the
compelling interest inquiry, just as Heart of Atlanta and Jaycees did. "It is
certainly true," Justice Alito observed, "thai in applying RFRA 'courts
must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation
may impose on nonbeneficiaries."' 55 "That consideration," he added, "will
often inform the analysis of the Government's compelling interest and the
availability of a less restrictive means of advancing that interest."56
51 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,250 (1964).
52 United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 625.
" Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014); see supra text
accompanying note 22.
54 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779-80.
I d. at 2781 n.37 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005)).
56 Id. For development of this point, see NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 26, at 2580-85 (discussing
the compelling interest analysis in RFRA from the perspective of both the government enacting
legislation and the individuals the legislation protects).
Professor Thomas Berg, who believes that Hobby Lobby was decided correctly and indeed was
"an easy case," also acknowledges that an analysis of third-party harms is relevant to the inquiry into
compelling interests under RFRA. Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State,
38 HARv. J.L. & GENDER (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers
.cfrn?abstract id=2517633. In discussing the relevance of third-party harms, however, he emphasizes
"preserv[ing] the importance of religious freedom in the welfare state," which in his view means "there
must be some limits on what counts as a harm to others that justifies state regulation seriously
burdening religion." Id. at 35.
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IV. THE CASE OF CONTRACEPTIVE ACCESS
The Court's opinions in Hobby Lobby, Jaycees, and the race
discrimination cases57 show that the government's compelling interests in
requiring insurance coverage of contraception are assessed both from the
perspective of the community and of the individuals protected by the law.
As noted in Part II, the federal government's merits brief in Hobby Lobby
identified some, but not all, of these dimensions of the government's
compelling interests. 8 This is because the federal government tended to
assume the perspective of the community-not of the individual female
employees-in identifying its compelling interests, and it tended to focus
on material considerations, not on the creation of social meanings. For
example, the Solicitor General emphasized the government's compelling
interest in a uniform insurance system, 9 as well as a compelling interest in
public health.6 ° Attention to material concerns similarly shaped the
government's discussion of gender equality, which focused on the higher
costs that women face relative to men in obtaining effective
contraception.6 These considerations are each crucial dimensions of the
government's compelling interests. But the analysis of Part III suggests
aspects of the government's compelling interests that were identified. by
the government and endorsed by the Court, but not extensively discussed
by either. We now point to additional dimensions of the government's
interests in improving employees' access to contraception, in addition to
public health and sex equity in compensation.
" See, e.g., supra notes 33-36 (discussing Bob Jones University).
58 See supra text accompanying notes 27-30 (discussing the government's argument).
19 The government compared its interest in "ensuring a 'comprehensive insurance system with a
variety of benefits available to all participants' to previously accepted interests in other social
programs. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 38-39, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258 (1982)). The government
also characterized this interest as an interest in the "continued well-being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents" through their "[employee benefit] plans," an interest expressed by
Congress in enacting ERISA. Id. at 42 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)).
Both characterizations were supported by the government's claim that there is "a compelling interest in
uniform application of a particular program by offering evidence that granting the requested religious
accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to administer the program." Id. at 45 (quoting
Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435 (2006)).
1 The federal government and its amici devoted more attention to the impact of contraceptives on
the health of families, rather than the impact on individual women. For example, the government
emphasized that there is a "wealth of empirical data demonstrating that providing women access to
contraceptives without cost-sharing has significant health benefits for them and their children," id. at
15, and that as a result a "woman's ability to control whether and when she will become pregnant has
highly significant impacts on her health, her child's health, and the economic well-being of herself and
her family," id at 46.
61 See id. at 49 ("The contraceptive-coverage provision also advances the government's related
compelling interest in assuring that women have equal access to recommended health-care services.")
(citing 78 Fed. Reg. 39,872, 39,887 (July 2, 2013)).
[Vol. 47:1025
COMPELLING INTERESTS AND CONTRACEPTION
The federal government has a compelling interest in promoting
women's equal citizenship in American society, given women's exclusion
from key sites of citizenship for most of American history. Women's
exclusion, it is important to note, was accomplished in significant part by
requiring that they occupy the role of caregivers, not breadwinners.62
Traditional sex role assumptions shaped efforts to control women's
decisions about childbearing, contributing to the criminalization of
abortion and contraception in the nineteenth century 63 and to gender-biased
enforcement of the ban on contraception that the Court struck down in
Griswold.64 These assumptions persisted in recognizable forms into the
modem era.65
Over the centuries in which law and custom dictated that women were
to serve as caregivers and men as breadwinners, assumptions about the
"ideal worker"66 shaped the development of educational and employment
institutions. Given these widespread and deeply entrenched norms and
arrangements, control over the timing of childbearing and childrearing is
now crucial to women's full and equal participation in the educational and
economic spheres. Contraception both enables and symbolizes women's
interest in coordinating work and family. As the Department of Health and
Human Services explained, "[c]ontraceptive coverage, by reducing the
number of unintended and potentially unhealthy pregnancies... allow[s]
women to achieve equal status as healthy and productive members of the
62 Cf Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979) (observing that laws enforcing this traditional role
allocation are now unconstitutional).
63 "Separate spheres" reasoning about women pervaded arguments for criminalizing abortion and
contraception in the decades after the Civil War. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv.
261, 293-318 (1992) (analyzing the "nineteenth century campaign against abortion").
64 Elsewhere we have shown that Connecticut's enforcement of its ban on contraception in
Griswold reflected and reinforced traditional double standards in matters of sex and parenting. See
generally Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Griswold at 50: Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124
YALE L.J.F. (2015), available at http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/forum/contraception-as-a-sex-equality-
right (discussing the ways that Griswold expanded both liberty and equality for women). Connecticut
allowed a health exception to its ban on contraception for men, but not for women, and it allowed men
to purchase the most effective form of contraception for men (condoms), but did not allow women to
purchase the most effective forms of contraception for women (diaphragms or the pill). Id. at 4.
65 The modem Court has recognized that denying women control over their reproductive capacity
may reflect, at least in part, constitutionally suspect judgments about women's roles that reinforce their
exclusion from the economic and social spheres. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 852, 856 (1992) ("Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of
our histoiy and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.").
66 See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (2000) ("[T]he ideal worker [is] someone who works at least forty hours a week
year round. This ideal-worker norm, framed around the traditional life patterns of men, excludes most
mothers of childbearing age.").
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job force."67 This very understanding prompted criticism of contraception
by amici supporting Hobby Lobby.6 8
Like the government's interest in ending race and sex discrimination,
the government's interest in providing employees access to contraception
has both backward and forward looking dimensions. Providing access
redresses exclusion and promotes inclusion. Laws improving employee
access to contraception function like (and in coordination with) laws
requiring employers to provide family leave.69 Laws improving employee
access to contraception help women (and men) negotiate institutions that
are organized on the ideal worker model, moving American society a step
closer to the day that paths to leadership are visibly open to those with
caregiving responsibilities as well as those without.
The interest in integrating caregivers in the workplace, like many
67 The Department of Health and Human Services stated:
Researchers have shown that access to contraception improves the social and
economic status of women. Contraceptive coverage, by reducing the number of
unintended and potentially unhealthy pregnancies, furthers the goal of eliminating
this disparity by allowing women to achieve equal status as healthy and productive
members of the job force.
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (footnote
omitted).
6 Several of the amici who opposed the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement argued that
contraception harms women spiritually, emotionally, and physically by undermining-and
undermining society's respect for-the role of women as mothers. See, e.g., Brief of American
Freedom Law Center as Amicus Curiae at 9, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (No. 13-354) ("[T]he widespread use of contraceptives has . . . harmed women physically,
emotionally, morally, and spiritually-and has, in many respects, reduced her to the 'mere instrument
for the satisfaction of [man's] own desires."'); Brief Amicus Curiae of Westminster Theological
Seminary at 22, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) ("The
Mandate does not purport to protect women from discrimination based on their being women or based
on their being pregnant. What it purports to do is to provide women a cost free way to avoid exercising
an aspect of their womanhood-their unique capacity to bear children. Promoting gender equality in that
way does not, and cannot, legitimize the Mandate."); Brief of Amicus Curiae Women Speak for
Themselves at 38, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2Q14) (No. 13-354) ("It is
demeaning to women to suggest that. women's fertility and their bearing and rearing of children, are
'barriers'-'plagu[ing]' women's economic, social and political integration, and women's
opportunities for 'equal access to... goods, privileges and advantages,'-requiring women's usage of
more contraception and ECs. Most women aspire to and do bear and rear children. They build society
itself, and need and deserve social support for this important contribution, among others."). The
arguments of these amici appear to echo a number of claims regarding the efficacy and impact of
contraceptives on women that Helen Alvare presented in No Compelling Interest: The "Birth Control"
Mandate and Religious Freedom, 58 VILL. L. REV. 379 (2013).
69 Cf Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736-37 (2003) (holding that to remedy
and deter violations of equal protection, Congress had authority to enact a law requiring employers to
provide unpaid family leave to men and women); id. at 735 ("In sum, the States' record of
unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of
leave benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation.") (footnote
omitted).
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regulatory interests, has material and expressive dimensions. Until
institutions are redesigned to welcome those with caregiving
responsibilities, helping women control the timing of birth sends a message
of inclusion. This is why the ACLU in Hobby Lobby argued that
invalidating the contraceptive-coverage requirement would "send the
message that women are second-class citizens, and that they are not
employees equally valued by the employer."7 Conversely, exempting
religious employers from the requirement that they include contraception
in insurance coverage because they deem contraception sinful may
stigmatize contraception and deter employees from using it.
To this point, we have examined the government's compelling
interests in promoting public health and supporting women's integration in
the workplace, considering these interests in requiring insurance coverage
of contraception from the perspective of the community. The decisions
surveyed in Part III also instruct us to examine the issue from the
perspective of the individual employees whose liberty and equality, both
materially and expressively, are potentially at stake. As noted above, the
Court in Hobby Lobby observed that RFRA requires an analysis of third-
party effects in determining the compelling interests that justify a legal
entitlement to contraceptive coverage.7 Third-party harms form part of the
analysis of compelling interests because this analysis includes an
examination of what is at stake from the horizon of the citizens on whose
behalf the government is acting.72
To understand these interests from the perspective of the individual,
we can look to the Court's contraception, abortion, sex equality, and gay
rights decisions. The Court in Bob Jones drew from Brown v. Board of
Education73 and its progeny in declaring a compelling interest in
70 Brief Amici Curiae of Julian Bond, the ACLU, the ACLU of Pa., the ACLU of Okla., the
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., & the Nat'l Coal. On Black Civic Participation, in Support
of the Gov't at 32, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354).
"' Supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Third-party effects also are relevant to the narrow
tailoring inquiry. What counts as a sufficient alternative must provide for all beneficiaries of the law.
See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 26, at 2585-86 (examining concerns about third-party harm inflicted
by complicity based conscience claims).
72 RFRA does not make an inquiry into third-party harms an express part of the statutory test
because the Court's previous free exercise cases did not include instances in which vindicating claims
of religious liberty would have caused harms to third parties. See, e.g., NeJaime & Siegel, supra note
26, at 2524-29 (discussing differences between the free exercise cases that Congress invoked in RFRA
and complicity-based conscience claims); Catherine Fisk, Guest Post: Does Hobby Lobby Allow
Gender Discrimination?, ONLABOR (Nov. 7, 2014), http://onlabor.org/2014/l1/07/guest-post-does-
hobby-lobby-allow-gender-discrimination ("Before Hobby Lobby, the Court's religious freedom cases
typically involved religious people who quit their jobs, or wished to avoid the draft or to ingest
prohibited substances, and recognition of their right to free exercise did not infringe others' rights to
equal treatment under law.").
" 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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eradicating race discrimination,74 and the Court in Jaycees drew from
Frontiero v. Richardson75 and its progeny in declaring a compelling
interest in eradication sex discrimination. 76 Likewise, the Court in Hobby
Lobby cited Griswold in its discussion of compelling interests.77 The
Griswold line of cases (Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 Roe v. Wade,79
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,80 Lawrence v.
Texas,8' and United States v. Windsor82 ) have much to teach about the
individual's concern with access to contraception. So do the equal
protection sex discrimination line of cases. As documented below, all these
decisions emphasize the liberty concern of women in bodily integrity, and
they require the government to respect the liberty and equality concerns of
those who might become pregnant or assume caregiving responsibilities.
Pregnancy can, under various circumstances, be a threat to a woman's
health or life. The Court noted this fact in Poe v. Ullman83 and emphasized
it in Eisenstadt.84 So did Justice Ginsburg in Hobby Lobby.85 Bodily
integrity is at the root of the liberty concern that is protected in the Court's
contraception and abortion cases.86 Insurance coverage of contraception
substantially addresses this individual concern.
7' Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983) (citing Brown, 347 U.S. 483).
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
76 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625-626 (1984) (citing, inter alia,
Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677).
" Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779-80 (2014) (citing Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965)).
78 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
79 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
'o 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
" 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
82 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
83 367 U.S. 497, 498 (1961) (observing that the Connecticut ban on contraception applies to
"married couples and even under claim that conception would constitute a serious threat to the health or
life of the female spouse"); see id. at 498 ("Mrs. Poe has had three consecutive pregnancies terminating
in infants with multiple congenital abnormalities from which each died shortly after birth."); id. at 500
("Another pregnancy [for Mrs. Doe] would be exceedingly perilous to her life."); id. at 510 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ("One wife is pathetically ill, having delivered a stillborn fetus. If she becomes pregnant
again, her life will be gravely jeopardized.").
'4 See 410 U.S. at 153 ("The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early
pregnancy may be involved.").
5 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2799 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("The coverage helps safeguard the health of women for whom pregnancy may be hazardous, even life
threatening. And the mandate secures benefits wholly unrelated to pregnancy, preventing certain
cancers, menstrual disorders, and pelvic pain.") (citation omitted).86 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992)
("It is an inescapable biological fact that state regulation with respect to the child a woman is carrying
will have a far greater impact on the mother's liberty than on the father's. The effect of state regulation
on a woman's protected liberty is doubly deserving of scrutiny in such a case, as the State has touched
not only upon the private sphere of the family but upon the very bodily integrity of the pregnant
woman.") (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990)).
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Both the liberty and the equality cases protect the individual's concern
with self-definition-her freedom to develop a life plan free from
governmental control or stereotypical constraints. This concern with self-
definition extends to intimacy and to family formation.87 As importantly, it
extends to life projects whose prospects for success turn in substantial part
on the successful integration of caregiving and breadwinning.8s Casey
makes especially vivid the practical and dignitary stakes for women in
controlling how to coordinate their caregiving and breadwinning roles. The
decision recognizes-as Justice Ginsburg reminded us in Hobby Lobby89-
that "[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives."9
The Court's constitutional sex equality cases also protect the ability of
women and men to integrate their work and family lives. Decisions such as
Frontiero v. Richardson,91 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,9 2 and United States
v. Virginia93 recognize that the government has long interfered with the
choices of women and men concerning caregiving and breadwinning roles,
and the cases prohibit state action of this kind.94 In Nevada Department of
87 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (citing Lawrence for the
proposition that "the Constitution protects" the "moral and sexual choices" of same-sex couples);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003) ("In all events we think that our laws and traditions in
the past half century are of most relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness that
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex."); id. at 578 ("The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual
consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government."); Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 ("It is settled now, as it was when the Court heard arguments in
Roe v. Wade, that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic
decisions about family and parenthood... as well as bodily integrity.") (citations omitted).
88 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 ("[The pregnant woman's] suffering is too intimate and
personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman
must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society.").
89 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at
856).
'0 Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
91411 U.S. 677 (1973).
92 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
9' 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
" See, e.g., id. at 556 (holding that the Virginia Military Institute's male-only admissions policy
was unconstitutional absent an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender-biased policy);
Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 640, 653 (holding unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act that
denied benefits to widowed fathers with children because the benefits were available only to women);
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-91 (holding unconstitutional a federal statute requiring wives in the military
to prove that their husbands were dependent on them in order to obtain a dependent's allowance when
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Human Resources v. Hibbs,95 the Court affirmed Congress's power under
the Fourteenth Amendment to enact laws that would break with this history
and help employees coordinate their work and family lives in new ways.96
Just as the liberty cases vindicate equality values, the equality cases
vindicate liberty values. Considering these two lines of cases together, we
can better appreciate how, both practically and expressively, the
government promotes the freedom and equality of women and men when it
ensures that individuals have access to affordable contraception. 97
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's cases make it clear that compelling
governmental interests-whether in eradicating race or sex discrimination,
or in ensuring employee access to contraception-are understood both
from the perspective of the community and of the individual. The federal
government has compelling interests in ensuring access to contraception.
From within the horizon of the community, access to contraception
promotes public health and helps integrate those who bear and rear
children as participants in all spheres of life. From within the horizon of
the individual, access to contraception protects concerns about bodily
integrity, autonomy, and equality. Protecting public health is enormously
important, as is ensuring that insurance benefits equally cover the expenses
of male and female employees. But these concerns should not obscure the
forms of social participation that are enabled and affirmed by control over
the timing of bearing and rearing children.98 Most fundamentally at stake is
"a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy
equal citizenship stature' 99
This more comprehensive account of the government's compelling
interests in promoting access to contraception matters in politics and in
law. Political debates over contraceptive coverage are not fully or fairly
framed when they are characterized as pitting material concerns with
protecting public health and reducing the costs of women's contraception
husbands in the military automatically obtained a dependent's allowance regardless of whether their
wives were in fact dependent on them).
" 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
96 Id. at 734-35 (holding that Congress had authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause by requiring employers to provide unpaid family
leave to men and women).
97 Cf Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) ("Equality of treatment and the due process
right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.").
98 The controversiality of the government's interests in certain religious communities does not
render them uncompelling, just as the long controversiality of the governmental interests in combatting
race discrimination and sex discrimination in certain communities (documented in Part I1) did/does not
render them uncompelling.
99 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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against moral concerns with protecting religious liberty and promoting the
inclusion of religious Americans in public life. There are profound moral
concerns, as well as concerns with inclusion, on both sides of the debate.
On the account of governmental interests that we have provided, defenders
of contraceptive coverage need not cede any ground sounding in morality
or meaning.
Legally, it makes a major difference in heightened scrutiny cases-
under the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RFRA-not
just whether there are sufficiently vital governmental interests, but also
what those interests are. Deciding whether a given regulation "(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest" '
depends upon having a full accounting of the relevant government
interests. We have not endeavored here to explain how courts should apply
RFRA,1 ° so we will limit ourselves to one observation in closing: an
understanding of the government's interests that focuses only on material
interests in public health and contraceptive cost is more susceptible to
compromise and tradeoffs than is one that also comprehends other
dimensions of the government's interests that we have discussed in this
Essay.
"0 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-l(b) (2012)).
... For one such account, see NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 26, at 2580-81, 2585-86 (discussing
relation of compelling interests, narrow tailoring, and third-party harm).
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